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ASSESSING THE SPANISH ARMY ROLE IN A FUTURE EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM

BY

Colonel Jose Manuel M. Huertas
Spanish Army

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The foundation of a Spanish national policy on peace and security is based on their participation in the Atlantic Alliance, their integration in the Western European Union, and a bilateral agreement with the United States of America.

The question which exists today is, does Spain have the necessary national commitment, public support, and military ability to perform the responsibilities emerging from these agreements?

In addressing this issue, this paper will assess the currently defined political will to perform a military role within the context of a "new" western security environment contrasted to Spanish public opinion. The latter, a significant factor when considering a nations policy towards peace and security today, shows evidence of differing from Government and political objectives. This was demonstrated recently, during the 1991 Gulf War, when the Spanish populace voiced objections and distinct feelings concerning the use of conscripts in conflicts or crises beyond Spain's national borders.

In relation to military abilities, the Spanish Armed Forces, especially the Army, are addressing a transformation process to increase their readiness to perform the most likely missions assigned in the context of a European Security System.

The conclusions based on a analysis of these elements of power and national strength, offer recommendations for consideration in guiding Spain's actions as she confronts the 21st Century.

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ASSESSING THE SPANISH ARMY ROLE IN A FUTURE EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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In relation to military abilities, the Spanish Armed Forces, especially the Army, are addressing a transformation process to increase their readiness to perform the most likely missions assigned in the context of a European Security System.

The conclusions based on a analysis of these elements of power and national strength, offer recommendations for consideration in guiding Spain's actions as she confronts the 21st Century.

INTRODUCTION.

After joining NATO in 1982, Spain applied for integration in the Western European Union (WEU) in 1988. As an European country, and a member of both organizations, Spain is obliged to participate in a future European security structure. However, Spain's future role is not yet defined. It will be based on a number of domestic and international factors which have to be resolved by the Spanish Government.

As a start point we should define and analyze Spanish security policy and the steps taken by Spain to join NATO, the main western defensive organization, and further integration in the WEU. Also, there are some factors in the Spanish domestic situation affecting the engagement of Spain in conflicts abroad. These characteristics define Spanish defense policy for the future.

However, from a political perspective, the characteristics and purpose of the future European security structure will have an important impact on the attitude of Spain. This is particularly important since several initiatives are emerging within Europe even though it is clear that NATO is going to constitute the main western transatlantic security organization according to the November 1991 Rome summit.

In the technical aspects, the level of readiness and capability of the Spanish Army will be a major factor determining its most likely role for the future. The performance of the Spanish Armed Forces in the Gulf crisis and as a subsequent

Spanish Armed Forces in the Gulf crisis and as a subsequent peace-keeping force under the United Nations Mandate, are good precedent setting examples.

While, there are a lot of factors influencing the Spanish contribution to European security, it is necessary to keep in mind that a key element of Spanish foreign policy, as stated by the Socialist Government, is to contribute to a European and Western security system. The purpose of this paper will be to further define the factors supporting or not supporting the contribution of the Spanish Army to a European security system, and explain the concept of its organization to perform this role.

SPANISH SECURITY POLICY

Political Background. The definition of Spanish national policy concerning peace and security was one of the most important issues the government of President Felipe Gonzalez had to confront upon triumphing at the polls in October 1982.

The existing policy was focused on three concepts: the Atlantic Alliance, the Western European Union, and the bilateral defense relationship with the United States. These three arrangements were not formally addressed during the campaign in order to preserve the consensus among all the political parties concerning foreign policy matters. This was agreed upon for the sake of solving important domestic problems which were emerging during this period of transition.

However, this consensus dissolved when the decision to join NATO was formally included in the government program presented to the Parliament by Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, on the occasion of his investiture as President of the Democratic Center Union (Union del Centro Democratico- UCD) Government, in February 1981¹.

Included in this program, the Government, on August 30 1981, presented a proposal to the Spanish Parliament to join NATO. This proposal was accepted with the only negative votes coming from the socialist and communist members. On this same day, the Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol- PSOE) presented a motion to the same forum, asking for a consultative referendum addressing the same subject². Their petition was rejected, after which the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jose Pedro Llorca forwarded a letter to the Secretary General of NATO stating the Spanish Government had declared itself ready to receive an invitation for accession to the Atlantic Alliance. So, on May 30, 1982, in a ceremony in Washington, Spain became a formal member of the Alliance.

The domestic political situation during this period was very complex as the Government was on the verge of a parliamentary crisis, one party was in an advanced stage of decomposition³ and this was the eve of a possible Socialist victory in the upcoming elections.

Without doubt, Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo's decision was a brave deed, especially during its initial development although it was not effectively presented and explained to the public. While

there are different explanations concerning the causes which motivated the President to make the decisions he did, the fact that participation in NATO was in the overall national interest and was consistent with the transition from dictatorial to democratic rule was not fully understood⁴.

On the other hand, the anti-NATO campaign had allowed the PSOE to consolidate its strength and popularity. Although the language used by Felipe Gonzalez against the Government was ambiguous, it was interpreted as a testimony of pacifism and reluctance to involve Spain in what was seen as a militarist NATO.

After the electoral victory of the PSOE on October 28, 1982, the Government, headed by Felipe Gonzalez, decided to freeze the process of incorporation of Spain into NATO's military structure and maintain the campaign promise to hold a consultative referendum.

This situation of "freezing" didn't mean the withdrawal of Spanish representatives in the different councils, groups, and committees of NATO. The Socialist Government initiated a 3 year delay in order to hold the referendum, and include two more important matters to be addressed:

- To join the EC and,
- To inform the Spanish public of the issues concerning NATO.

With this decision, the PSOE prepared the way to reverse the situation that it had provoked. The propaganda initiated by

the PSOE against NATO during the UCD Government period had been extremely effective. In 1975, 57 percent of the people surveyed in Spain had favored Spanish participation in NATO, but in 1983 that support had been reduced to 17 percent; those explicitly opposed had numbered 24 percent in 1975, but they had grown to 56 percent in 1983.

The announced referendum influenced not only the relationship with the members of the Atlantic Alliance but also affected the bilateral relationship with the USA and with the WEU which Spain was subsequently invited to join. Hence, Spanish Foreign Policy was focused on western solidarity with some ambiguity concerning security subjects in order to get the necessary flexibility to face the Spanish political transition period⁵.

It is necessary to keep in mind that while NATO is deeply rooted in the contemporary history of Europe, that conception is not shared by Spain, which has evolved differently from the Western European pattern⁶. In most of Europe there wasn't the struggle of "atlanticism" vs "europeanism", as there was in Spain.

"Atlanticism" was represented by the bilateral Agreement of 1982 between Spain and USA, which was considered imbalanced against Spanish security interests, because in any situation of crisis, air bases used by the US Air Forces would become important military objectives. "Europeanism" referred to the commitment of a fuller economic and political participation in

Europe and the European integration process which is symbolized by the European Community (EC).

Consequently, the Spanish Socialist Government resolved the tension between "atlanticism" and "europeanism", defining the Spanish security policy presented by the President to the Parliament in October 1984, through what would be called his "Decalogue on peace and security policy"⁷. Its most important points were: a) the maintenance of the status quo with respect to the Atlantic Alliance; b) the maintenance of the bilateral defense relationship with the United States, but with a progressive diminution of the American military presence on Spanish soil; c) the denuclearization of Spanish territory; d) Spanish presence in international fora dealing with disarmament; e) the return of Gibraltar; f) the integration of Spain in the WEU; g) improvement of bilateral relationships with other European countries; and, h) the elaboration of a Joint Strategic Plan.

On February 5, 1986 one month after the integration of Spain in the EC, Parliament approved a consultive referendum concerning Spanish membership in the Alliance. The campaign supporting incorporation in NATO which began in 1984, reached its maximum level.

As a consequence of the way the question was presented⁸ and the range of subjects addressed during the campaign, the referendum became a plebiscite on the government and a general vote of confidence for the socialists. The results showed the

majority backed the Government and it supported the general security policy, not only the relationship with NATO, but also with the USA and WEU⁹.

In the final document issued at the 31st National Meeting of the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) on January 1988, the framework of this policy was defined along with the future development of the socialist attitude toward security subjects. The most important aspects of that document pointed out that Spanish security policy must address aspects to¹⁰:

- . Reinforce the European pillar of NATO.
- . Create a common foreign and security policy in the forum of European Political Cooperation.
- . Develop a European Defense and Security System.
- . Update the existing forum of WEU, and reinforce the security links among european countries.

Although the referendum indicated support of the Government, it also provided the foundation for its security policy which was defined in the " Decalogue on peace and security policy." thus ensuring the autonomy of the Government on that subject for many years to come.

Public Opinion. The main characteristic of Spanish public opinion on security subjects, during the transition, was their lack of knowledge and even interest. During that time, the changing political situation had a direct impact on public opinion. It meant that politicians were in charge of creating, defining, and

molding the national security interests of the Spanish population. Thus, the PSOE, after assuming control of the Government, changed the thinking of its voters about the NATO.

According to different polls¹¹ taken in the 1980's, the profile of Spanish public opinion concerning security subjects showed a general lack of knowledge, but at the same time it was evident that the level of interest was growing.

Most of the population did not perceive any threat from the Soviet Union(SU) or its neighbors. Only some risk from Morocco, concerning the Spanish cities of Melilla and Ceuta, was identified, but then only 30 percent declared an interest to defend these cities against aggression.

As a general rule, it is fair to state that Spanish public opinion was divided on defense matters. Some Spaniards defended neutrality as a future political-military option and others, including a number of anti-militarists, demanded the disbandment of the Spanish Armed Forces and the use of military budgets to satisfy non-military needs.

There were also those who favored an armed neutrality policy, based on the structure of a professional Armed Forces. Another group preferred the partial integration of Spain in NATO, while denying the deployment of nuclear weapons on Spanish soil and the assignment of Spanish troops abroad under a foreign command. Additionally, there were advocates of full military integration into the defensive structure of Western Europe.

After the referendum, most of the public accepted partial

integration into NATO, while at the same time, they saw the necessity for full integration in Western Europe. From a security perspective this was becoming a general consensus.

On the other hand, compulsory Spanish military service was rejected by an important part of the population, mainly the younger people, and the military profession did not obtain a high level of confidence among different public activities.

As a result, public opinion today recognizes that neutrality is unrealistic and accepts the necessity of a small, professional Armed Forces. Nevertheless, Spaniards are still very sensitive about sending Spanish forces abroad.

This feeling was evident when the Spanish Navy was ordered to act during the 1991 Persian Gulf crisis. At that time, public opinion was against the decision because of the conscript composition of the ship's crews sent to cooperate in the embargo of Iraq , based on the mandate of the United Nations¹². Even the Government was surprised by the public's reaction to what was seen as a global crisis.

Although the idea of neutralism has been overcome, Spaniards are still divided about the involvement of their country in security affairs beyond Spanish borders. Although a majority understand the necessity for that kind of implication within Europe, or under the "umbrella" of a European Security System, there is a great division about Spanish involvement under NATO commitment.¹³

SPAIN: CAPABILITIES AND MISSIONS.

Spanish Army (SA) Capabilities. On paper, Spanish military power looks very impressive. Its Armed Forces of 257,400 ranks sixth in NATO, after the United States, Turkey, France, Germany, and Italy; with a reserve numbering about 2 million.

On the other hand, the defense spending amounts to only 2 percent of GNP, and most of the units, especially in the Army, lack experience in combined operations. The key shortfall that results from this small military budget is the lack of funds for equipment modernization. Its effectiveness and interoperability is limited and very dependent on maintenance and spare parts.

The Army accounts for three-fourths (180,000) of the Spanish military manpower. Most are conscripts¹⁴ who serve for twelve months, but will now only serve nine months, beginning in 1992¹⁵.

The Spanish Army is being transformed in three main areas:

- Increased flexibility to adapt to any circumstance to meet the most likely future threat.
- Interoperability with foreign forces.
- Increased readiness.

To accomplish the above, the SA developed a conceptual phase with "Plan META" (1980-85), followed by " Plan REORGANIZACION" (1985-90), and the planning phase with "Plan RETO" to be developed by 1996.

The whole planning process was successively explained in different Joint Strategic Plans issued by the Ministry of Defense.

Currently, it is possible to distinguish three main groups in the basic structure of the Spanish Army¹⁶:

- Units under Regional Operational Commands.
- General Reserve Forces.
- Army Aviation.

The first group, divided in eight military regions combines all armor and mechanized units (Infantry and Cavalry) totaling 14 brigades; 6 special operation battalions which maintain a high level of readiness and effectiveness; and 2 mountain divisions with good operational training in medium and high mountain terrain.

The second group, the General Reserve Forces, consists of the most professional units with the highest level of effectiveness:

- Spanish Legion (7,000 men) with 3 regiments (mechanized and motorized battalions).
- 1 Airborne Brigade (AB) (3 battalions)
- 1 Air Defense Command (6 AD Rgt. with HAWK, NIKE, and ROLAND).
- 1 Field Arty Command.
- 1 Coast Arty Command.

The AB Bde is a well-trained, effective unit which is the main Army element of a Rapid Deployment Force. They possess a

large amount of experience in combined operations. The Spanish Legion has similar characteristics although a lower level of experience.

The third group consists of the Army Airmobile Force (FAMET), with a total of 183 helicopters (60 armed). All personnel in this unit are professional and their level of effectiveness is high.

Spanish involvement in Western Security. Spanish security policy as defined in the " Decalogue on peace and security " constitutes the basis for the incorporation of Spain into western security through four main relationships: NATO, WEU, USA, and United Nations(UN).

The basic characteristics of the model for Spanish participation in the Alliance are contained in the official communication sent by the Spanish Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense to their NATO counterparts and to the Secretary General of NATO after the referendum. They consist primarily of the non-incorporation of Spanish forces into the integrated military structure and the maintenance of the non-nuclearization of Spanish territory.

The complementary characteristics are a consequence of the General Principles of Participation in the Alliance presented by the Spanish Government and approved by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in May 1986. They essentially consist of participation in the NAC and its subsidiary bodies, in the Defense Planning

Committee (DPC), and the ~~military~~ contribution detailed in the Coordination Agreements between Spanish and Allied Commanders.

During the last few years, from a total of six agreements, four have been signed and endorsed by the DPC, and the 2 others, CHARLIE, related to the sensitive area of Gibraltar, and FOXTROT the most complex, are being developed in this time. These agreements cover the following areas:

ALPHA: To prevent the occupation of Spanish territory.

BRAVO: Air defense of Spanish territory and cooperation in adjacent areas.

CHARLIE: Control of the Strait of GIBRALTAR and its approaches.

DELTA: Naval and Air operations in the eastern part of the Atlantic Ocean.

ECHO: Naval and Air operations in the Western Mediterranean.

FOXTROT: Use of Spanish territory as a transit, support, and rear logistic area.

As a general rule, all of these missions apply to areas within space defined by Spain as Strategic Space of National Interest and are included in the Conceptual Military Framework(CMF) defined by NATO.

ALPHA, FOXTROT, and BRAVO are, in this order, the Spanish Army's major missions within NATO. The ALPHA agreement defines four main missions:

- Advanced defense of the Pyrenees, in strategic depth.

reinforcing other allied forces.

- Defense of the mediterranean coast, including Cadiz and the Baleares Islands.
- Defense of the Canary Islands to preserve transatlantic maritime lines.

The FOXTROT agreement states a large number of missions for the Army, many of them involving logistic support, developed through Host Nation Support Agreements (HNS) for allied forces. This agreement also provides security missions for rear and logistic areas in which the involvement of ground forces is essential.

Finally the BRAVO agreement establishes an Air Defense System covering key points in Spanish territory and adjacent areas.

It is clear that the defense of Spanish territory is tied to a NATO mission. However it is also necessary to add missions relating to specific national interests derived by the application of forces to defend Ceuta and Melilla, Spanish cities situated in the North of Africa.

Another way that the collaboration of Spain may be seen in the Western Security environment is through the Western European Union (WEU). The Spanish Government emphasized in May 1988 (the start point of negotiations) that Spain, as a member of the European Community and of the Atlantic Alliance, considered itself fully committed to the process of European construction and integration and as such it would participate in matters

related to security. Therefore, the Spanish Government accepted without reservation and in its entirety, the 1984 WEU Rome Declaration and 1987 WEU Hague Platform. Spain is prepared to participate fully in their implementation and has accepted its obligations arising from the modified Brussels Treaty- subject to reservations about Article X¹⁷.

The full integration of Spain in the WEU was confirmed in the Gulf Crisis where the Spanish Government made early decisions (September 1990) in order¹⁸:

- To participate actively, with other countries of WEU, in the maritime embargo imposed on Iraq and,
- To provide logistic support to the coalition forces deployed in the Persian Gulf Area.

The first decision resulted in sending a Task Force composed of 2 Corvettes and one Frigate to the assigned area, which performed a total of 4,073 ship identifications and 174 inspection visits to merchant vessels.

The second decision was, in general terms:

- To supply some portable miscellaneous equipment and conduct airlift missions to other countries participating in the coalition against Iraq, deployed in Saudi Arabia.
- To provide maritime transport of French troops and cargo.
- To furnish permanent availability of 790 beds in Spanish military hospitals, and to attend to casualties under special circumstances.

The attitude of Spain facing other recent European

initiatives has been very positive. As such, the Spanish Minister of Defense (MOD), Julian Garcia Vargas has asked several times for an increase to the defense budget¹⁹, and has declared his support for the initiative of Paris and Bonn to create a French-German Rapid Deployment unit. MOD Garcia Vargas has indicated that he is prepared to put Spanish troops under the command of the WEU²⁰.

Spain is also connected to western security through a bilateral agreement with the United States. This agreement, much disputed before, revealed itself as an extraordinary tool to allow Spanish support to the U.S. Air Force (USAF) during the Desert Storm Operation.

This support was possible because the Spanish Government not only helped to the extreme limits of the written requirements in the "Agreement on Defense Cooperation between the Kingdom of Spain and the United States of America" but also made a broad interpretation of Art. 12 of this agreement²¹.

The mentioned support to the USAF during the Desert Shield and Desert Storm operations represented²² an impressive increase of air traffic at the Spanish bases of Rota, Moron, Torrejon, and Zaragoza, a fuel consumption more than 40 percent over normal requirements, and the availability of 100 beds in Spanish military hospitals.

In addition, Spain is ready to perform its missions within NATO and the WEU. Spain has also participated in the following United Nations sponsored activities:

- United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEN).
- United Nations Transition Assistance Group, Namibia.
- United Nations Central America (ONUCA).
- United Nations Electoral Verification Haiti (ONUVEH)
- Provide Comfort Operation Kurdistan, (Iraq).

In this last operation, Spain participated in Task Force "Bravo" with 3 Airborne Companies, Combat Engineers, Signal units, 1 Helicopter group (2 Chinooks and 5 UH-1H), and an Advanced Medical Echelon (AMET) situated in Shiladiza (NW of Iraq)²³.

NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY STRUCTURE.

European countries have begun to look not only to NATO for their security but to new security structures which may, in the future, bring East and West together.

In July 1990, the concept of a "multinational force" began to be used²⁴. It first appeared within NATO, but it has been applied to solve problems in the Gulf crisis and can even be extended to the WEU or any other security structure emerging in the future.

Operations such as "Desert Storm" and "Provide Comfort" are examples of how a multinational structure can be used to deal with conflict, not only because such a structure represents the collective will of a group of nations, but it also allows participating states to field smaller armies.

After the last ROME summit (November 7,1991) the role of NATO, as an organization linking the USA and Europe, has been reaffirmed. However, there are several factors supporting the necessity of a multinational force outside the framework of NATO:

- Any conflict occurring outside the area of application noted in Art. VI of the Washington Treaty is considered out-of-area.
- The most likely future threat will be represented by "instability" which may result in an "out-of-area" conflict.
- Most European countries need a international organization to be involved in that kind of conflict.
- Normally, the decision to engage multinational forces provides time to apply economic and political pressure as a deterrent before using military forces.
- Efforts in European security issues would be in conjunction with those addressed to get the political and economic European integration.

From a European point of view, a European Corp is desirable for employment in those cases where NATO cannot respond, mainly out-of-area conflicts.

According to this solution and keeping in mind that most European governments are dealing with small defense budgets, as a proportion of their GDP, they cannot afford having some forces assigned to NATO and others integrated in a purely European organization. Therefore, a European task force could have a dual

assignment, NATO and WEU, to be involved in conflicts according to the situation²⁵.

With this dual assignment system the risk of some problems including coordination , command, and control would be likely. At least initially, there are several very important advantages relating to common training, and operational procedures based on NATO experiences.

In this aspect, the multinational concept, as stated by NATO, and the scheme of "build-up", to engage forces according to the development of the situation, can become a solid framework for the future WEU of any other European security structure. So, although initiatives such as the French-German unit have raised some criticism, they can become the basis of an "Rapid Reaction Force" (RRF) within the WEU, similar to the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) of NATO. This force could be supported, if necessary, by reinforcing multinational forces²⁶.

CONCLUSION

Spain is involved in consolidating its position in Europe through integration in European organizations. This objective has an unavoidable security component to be assumed by Spain.

In this paper we have seen that the Spanish people express the desire to be integrated in Europe and assume security responsibilities. This political will is shared by the most important Spanish political parties, the right, center, and left

of the political spectrum, and is defined in the "Decalogue on peace and security policy" expressed by the President of the Spanish Government in October, 1984.

After EC-92 fully integrates Spain in Europe, problems emerging in Europe or affecting European interests will affect Spain more directly than before. Spain does not have enough political, economic, and military power to face its problems by itself. Thus Spain requires the assistance of its European partners as much as they need Spain's assistance. A majority of the Spanish population shares and accepts this situation. Ideas such as isolationism or neutrality are finished and integration in Europe has become a Spanish objective, not only in economic or political terms, but also in aspects of security.

Finally, from a military point of view, the Spanish Armed Forces have professional officers and soldiers with high technical skill and wide knowledge, like its European partners.

These characteristics make it easy to support the contribution of the Spanish Armed Forces to western security through a European security system or within NATO. Nevertheless, it is necessary to keep in mind some negative factors which, although they are not decisive, need to be corrected.

A part of the general Spanish public, including those who support European integration, lack knowledge about security subjects. This leads to baseless fears and misinformed opinions. In addition to this, the conscription system of military service provokes a sensitive feeling about sending military units beyond

Spanish borders. Also, as a consequence of the conscription system, the Spanish Army lacks professionalism in the lowest ranks (privates). Similarly, because of a small defense budget there are problems in equipment and communications systems. Both influence effectiveness in combined operations. However, the Spanish Army will not need a great transformation to suit its most likely role within NATO and/or an European security system.

In this matter, as stated by NATO²⁷, the multinational concept under a scheme of "build-up" looks like the most proper way to solve any conflict in the future after running out of political means.

In a conflict situation within the NATO area, the Spanish Army, according to the Agreements between Spain and NATO, will provide for the defense of Spanish territory, and assure Spain is used as a transit, support, and rear logistic area.

On the other hand, Spanish involvement in out-of-area conflicts under a European security structure (WEU or any other) does not have any formal restriction. Under this framework, the SA may contribute with different units not only to the multinational RRF but also to "Reinforcement Forces".

According to this spectrum of missions, the SA should adopt, in the years to come, a new force structure to increase its flexibility and interoperability with foreign forces. The basis of this new structure could be:

- Rapid Deployment Force(RDF), to be integrated in the RRF.

It could consist of the AB Brigade, Legion Special

Operations Unit, and helicopters from the Army Aviation Unit.

- Maneuver Forces, to contribute to the "Reinforcement Forces" with 1 Mechanized Division, 1 Armored Brigade, and 1 Cavalry Brigade.
- Main Defence Forces, to perform the defense of the Spanish territory and to assure it as a logistical base. These forces would be 2 Mountain Divisions, 1 Mechanized Division, 2 Rifle Divisions, and an Air Defense Command.

At the same time, the SA should carry out a modernization program affecting mainly its equipment, maintenance, and communication systems. As regards personnel policy, it appears necessary to increase the professionalism in the lowest ranks (privates), reducing the conscription system to the minimum.

With this organization and modernization program, Spain will be ready, in the coming years, to perform the most likely missions not only within NATO, but also to cooperate with other European countries to achieve meaningful European security.

ENDNOTES

¹Investiture lecture. Spanish Congress bibliography. This announcement was previously made by the head of Foreign Affairs of Adolfo Suarez's last Government in 1980.

²In this matter the Spanish Socialist Party showed fidelity to the 1976 Socialist Meeting in which the idea about a referendum was approved.

³To this circumstance, the absence of a global definition of foreign and national security must be added, and also the knowledge of SPAIN's role within the alliance. Spanish Congress bibliography. Congress and Senate Debate.

⁴Javier Tusell. Transition to democracy and membership in NATO. pp 11-19. In the same work, this author also explains the decision of the Government to create a situation whereby the PSOE would come to its own realization, once in the control of the government. In this aspect it is necessary to remember that principal socialist leaders in exile, Indalecio Prieto and Rodolfo Hopis, had asserted repeatedly that a democratic SPAIN ought to join NATO.

⁵Emilio A. Rodriguez. NATO and trends in Spanish Foreign Policy. pp 64-66. This singularity began with the referendum, never before had a NATO member taken the issue of participation in the organization to its voters.

⁶Joaquin Abril Martorell. Spain: A singular Ally. pp 41-46. The author bases this statement several reasons as: not shared threat, nor German occupation, Spanish civil war, three decades of isolation, etc.

⁷The document presented by the President of the Government was summarized in ten points, so that it took the name of "Decalogue".

⁸Spanish State Gazette. March 1986. Referendum Text. "The Government considers it in the national interest that SPAIN remain in the Atlantic Alliance and resolves that established on the following terms:

1. The participation of Spain in the Atlantic Alliance will not include its incorporation in the integrated military structure.
2. The prohibition on the installation, storing or

introducing nuclear arms on Spanish territory will be continued.

3. The progressive reduction of the military presence of the United States in Spain will be proceeded with.

" Do you consider it advisable for SPAIN to remain in the Atlantic Alliance according to the terms set forth by Government of the nation?".

⁹MAS Press Agency. Spain and NATO. December, 1987. p.4. The official result were:

- Voting Population = 28,828,434.
- Participation = 59.74%
- Yes = 9,042,951
- No = 8,859,977
- Abstention = 11,604,327 (40.26%)

¹⁰PSOE. Act Summary. MADRID. Jan.1988.

¹¹MAS Press Agency. Spaniards, War, and NATO. December, 1987. p.7. Different statistics published by official and non-official organizations in those years.(1982-1988)

¹²Spanish Mass Media. August 1990-Feb 1991. There were some reports against Spanish participation. The Government had to react quickly. There were demonstrations and citizen movements against the decision.

¹³La Opinion Publica Espanola y la Politica Exterior. Informe INCIPE. p 77. December 19, 1991. According to statistics carried out by Instituto de Cuestiones Internacionales, 42% of the surveyed people support the relationship with NATO and exactly the same percentage are opposite to it.

¹⁴IISS. Military Balance 1991. pp. 71-73. The Army has about 60,000 professionals, most of them are officers and about 6,000 privates with a term of service extended voluntarily to 24 or 36 months.

¹⁵Department of Defense Gazette. In November 13,1991, the Congress voted affirmatively a new Military Service Project reducing the terms of service to nine months and allowing to conscripts to choose the city and branch to accomplish the duty.

¹⁶IISS. Military Balance 1991. pp 71-73

¹⁷The Brussels Treaty. Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collabotation and Collective Self-Defence. Brussels, March 17, 1948. Article X refers to provisions applying to disputes between members. Spain take consideration the problem with the United Kingdom related to Gibraltar treated in the United Nations.

¹⁸Report to members of the US Congress. Spanish involvement in the Persian Gulf Crisis. Madrid 3 April 1991. Classified material. However, on December 30, 1991 some newspapers, e.g. "El Pais" p.24, published data about the Spanish involvement although with a lack of accuracy.

¹⁹Foreign Broadcast Information Service. West Europe. 24 October 1991. p.18. The Minister not only asked for increasing the defense budget but also stated the obligations toward Europe emerging in the defense sphere.

²⁰Foreign Broadcast Information Service. West Europe. 18 October 1991. p.29.

²¹Agreement on Defense Cooperation between the Kingdom of Spain and the United States of America. Art. 12: In case of external threat or attack against either party,... the time and manner of use of the support installations and authorizations referred to in the agreement, shall be subject of urgent consultations between the two governments and shall be determined by mutual agreement, without prejudice to either party's inherent right to direct and immediate self-defense.

²²Report to members of the US Congress. Spanish involvement in the Persian Gulf Crisis. Madrid 3 April 1991. Classified material. However, on December 30, 1991, some newspapers, e.g. "El Pais" p. 24, published data about the Spanish involvement, although with a lack of accuracy.

²³Spanish Defense Review. Spaniards in the World. June 1991. pp 1-15.

²⁴Final Communique NATO London Summit. July 1990.

²⁵Foreign Broadcast Information Service. West Europe. NATO Secretary General Woerner Interview on NATO's future role. November 5, 1991. pp 3-5.

²⁶NATO Press Communique S-1 (91) 85. Rome. November 7, 1991. "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept." It established a new NATO forces structure: Rapid Reaction, Main Defense, and Augmentation Forces.

²⁷Final NATO London Summit. July 1990.

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